The UAE’s Modernization and (Shaky) Religious Credentials

Since its formation in 1971, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has ridden the wave of increasing oil prices to one of the highest per capita GDPs in the world, which at $40,200 in 2010, ranked just ahead of Canada.[1]  Accompanying this dramatic rise has been an inevitable period of rapid socioeconomic development, epitomized in the past decade by the bamboo-like growth of skyscrapers across the Dubai skyline and the massive influx of foreign workers seeking the benefits of globalization.  Yet, of the world’s eight remaining absolute monarchies, in terms of autocratic structures and lack of political freedom, the UAE consistently ranks second only to Saudi Arabia.[2]  At first glance, it is perplexing how such ostensible modernization can proceed apart from a corresponding liberalization of the UAE’s civil society.  Indeed, the paradox seems readily apparent to many observers, who regularly dub the UAE with such epithets as “Land of Contradictions”[3] or “Gilded Cage.”[4]

Reconciling the incongruity between the UAE’s commitment to modern markets and technology with its authoritarian political regime requires the realization that the former is being purchased at the expense of civil and political liberties, a tradeoff referred to as “the ruling bargain.”[5]  The legitimacy of the UAE government is largely rooted in its ability to provide the conditions necessary for commerce to flourish and thus for its inhabitants to achieve financial success.  Political stability is the foremost criterion in this regard.  However, with an expatriate (non-national) population that comprises approximately 80 percent of all UAE inhabitants,[6] the UAE government must also bolster its legitimacy in the eyes of its nationals by bridging the gap between a foreigner-dominated public sphere and its more traditional polity.

The primary resources the UAE government has at its disposal to bridge this gap are ideological, cultural, and religious ones.  Ideologically, the UAE since its inception has supported, directly or indirectly, just about every Arab cause in the Middle East, even as its very existence depends on an American security umbrella.  Culturally, the Emirati government has refurbished traditional forts and towers and has sponsored the development of a robust camel racing industry, even though the latter has been shown never to have been a big part of the bedouin lifestyle.  Religiously, the government manages all Islamic associations and charities, disbursing funds to the underprivileged in a manner intended to attract the most publicity, while also constructing new mosques and Islamic centers at a remarkable clip.  (In 2005, it was estimated that the UAE had one mosque for every 150 male UAE nationals.[7])

The matter of the UAE regime’s religious credentials is actually one of the most pressing concerns for nationals who fear cultural and moral annihilation at the hands of expatriate visitors.  What rare public debate occurs on the Emirati identity often centers around the tension that exists between the exigencies of commerce and those of Islam.  That is, the lax enforcement of Islamic prescriptions attracts Westerners and Arabs from more conservative parts of the Middle East in droves while simultaneously making a mockery of the UAE’s pretensions to piety.  Examples of this tension abound, especially in Dubai.  On the one hand, Dubai has earned the distinct honor of being the human trafficking capital of the world[8]; it plays host to a booming nightlife where alcohol flows freely (if expensively); and it often features women in skimpy dresses brushing past nationals in traditional robes and abayas, driving one tabloid to run a headline directing, “Show Some Respect.”[9]  On the other hand, Islam is the official state religion of the UAE and Islamic shari‘a law still frames many of the principles on which the constitution and judicial system are based.  As one scholar summarizes the danger, “It is undoubtedly feared that any future erosion of Islamic standards and criteria will reduce the importance of an Islamic variant of Weber’s ‘natural law’ as an additional basis for legitimacy and survival [of the UAE regime].”[10]

For the time being, it appears that the UAE is acting in the spirit of Islam only to the extent that it can maintain an upstanding public façade without compromising the conditions favorable to commerce.  Both aspects of this equation—piety and business—are critical in the Emirati government’s legitimacy formula.  This explains why Sheikh Muhammad of Dubai would acquire a 40 percent stake in the strict Malaysian-based Bank of Islam, which prohibits the derivation of profit from activities involving alcohol, pork, or gambling, even while Dubai’s economic expansion relies on western-style mortgages, speculative investments, and international financial free zones in which companies are immune from federal law.[11]  It also explains why the UAE has been so active in its co-optation of mosques and Islamic groups within its borders.  Now thought to own at least 95 percent of mosques in the country,[12] the state advocates a mainstream Islam to serve as a bulwark against the radicalist trends sweeping the rest of the region.  Again, this method enhances the stability of the UAE, granting the regime greater legitimacy both at home and abroad and clearing the way for commerce.

The UAE’s autocratic regime may find that what it thought to be its greatest asset—globalization—is actually its greatest vulnerability.  The palpable tension that exists between religion and commerce has the potential to strip the regime of the legitimacy required to rule in the absence of political and civil liberties.  Perhaps money will talk louder than muezzins in the UAE.  But it is also possible that Emirati nationals start demanding a greater voice in governing their country and preserving their way of life if the government does not start addressing some of these contradictions.

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[1] “GDP – per capita (PPP).” The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed 18 February 2011. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html&gt;.

[2] “Freedom in the World Country Ratings, 1972-1973 to 2000-2001.” Freedom House. New York: Freedom House, 2001.

[3] Slackman, Michael. “A Land of Laws, and Contradictions.” The New York Times. 21 September 2008. Accessed 17 February 2011. <http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/a-land-of-laws-and-contradictions/&gt;.

[4] Ali, Syed. Dubai: Gilded Cage. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010.

[5] Davidson, Christopher M. Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. Pg 138.

[6] “United Arab Emirates.” The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed 18 February 2011. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ae.html&gt;.

[7] Davidson, Christopher M. The United Arab Emirates. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005. Pg 109.

[8] Ali, Syed. Dubai: Gilded Cage. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010. Pg 101.

[9] Fattah, Hasan M. “Beyond Skimpy Skirts, a Rare Debate on Identity.” The New York Times. 19 October 2006. Accessed 15 February 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/19/world/middleeast/19dubai.html?pagewanted= 1&sq=UAE%20islam&st=cse&scp=3>.

[10] Davidson, Christopher M. The United Arab Emirates. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005. Pg 78.

[11] Davidson, Christopher M. Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. Pg 174.

[12] Davidson, Christopher M. The United Arab Emirates. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005. Pg 275.